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The Application of the Morton Principles in Canada 
Steamship Lines Ltd v The King in Singapore 
Reconsidered 
Wee Ling Loo* 
For the interpretation of clauses that purport to allow a contracting party, the proferens, to exclude or limit, or be indemnified 
against, liability that arises by reason of his or his agents’ negligence, certain principles were laid down by the Privy Council 
in 1952 in Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v The King. Famously known as the ‘Morton principles’ (named after Lord Morton 
who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council) or the ‘Canada SS rules’ or guidelines, they prescribe a three-step test to 
determine if these clauses effectively provide the protection sought by the proferens. In Singapore, the Court of Appeal in 
Marina Centre Holdings Pte Ltd v Pars Carpet Gallery Pte Ltd elucidated the application of the principles. Two subsequent 
High Court decisions, however, did not appear to have applied the principles in like manner or with clarity. This article 
attempts to provide a clearer understanding of how the Morton principles operate and to consider their continued utility in 
Singapore. The writer concludes that while the principles serve a purpose in light of gaps in the UCTA, complexity in 
application would require judicial clarity and precision for their coherent use, which itself presents a challenge. Additional 
problems, including the inability of the Morton principles to adequately fill the gaps in the UCTA, may make reform attractive 
as a practical way forward. Obstacles to reform may mean, however, that it is premature to discard the Morton principles for 
now.  
For the interpretation of clauses that purport to allow a contracting party, the proferens, to exclude 
or limit, or be indemnified against, liability that arises by reason of his or his agents’ negligence, 
certain principles were laid down by the Privy Council in 1952 in an appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v The King [1952] 1 AC 192 (Canada Steamship). 
These principles are famously known as the ‘Morton principles’ named after Lord Morton who 
delivered the judgment of the Privy Council. They have also been referred to as the ‘Canada SS 
rules’ or guidelines. In brief, the Morton principles prescribe a three-step test to determine if these 
clauses effectively provide the protection sought by the proferens. 
The Morton principles are undeniably part of Singapore law having been expressly approved 
and followed by the Singapore Court of Appeal on two occasions (Marina Centre Holdings Pte Ltd v 
Pars Carpet Gallery Pte Ltd [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 899–917 [7]–[47] (Marina Centre) and Hong 
Realty Pte Ltd v Chua Keng Mong [1994] 2 SLR(R) 90, 97–8 [18] (Hong Realty),1 and followed 
(Rapiscan Asia Pte Ltd v Global Container Freight Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 701, 716–9 [44]–[53] 
and 720 [55]–[56] (Rapiscan)) or confirmed as law by lower courts in a number of decisions 
(Holland Leedon Pte Ltd v C & P Transport Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 281 (31 December 2013) [208]). 
The Court of Appeal in Marina Centre provided the most comprehensive elucidation of the 
application of the principles in Singapore.2 Two more recent High Court decisions in CST Cleaning 
& Trading Pte Ltd v National Parks Board [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55 (CST Cleaning) and Jurong Port Pte 
Ltd v Huationg Inland Transport Service Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 53 (Jurong Port), however, did 
not apply the principles in like manner, despite referring to the Marina Centre decision. 
This article attempts to provide a clearer understanding of how the Morton principles operate 
and assess their continued utility in Singapore. In doing the former, the author notes that the CST 
Cleaning and Jurong Port decisions demonstrate a lack of judicial clarity in applying the principles 
when compared with the (UK) approach adopted in Marina Centre. In assessing the latter, the ease 
                                                          
*  Practice Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. The author thanks Associate 
Professor Low Kee Yang, Associate Professor Gary Chan Kok Yew and Associate Professor Goh Yihan for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors remain the author’s own.. 
1  In Hong Realty, the court did not explain how the principles applied to the facts.  
2  Although the Singapore High Court in Rapiscan applied all three Morton principles, it was short on reasoning. 
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of application of the principles and whether they provide a safeguard where the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act (Singapore, Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) does not will be considered. Insights will also be 
gleaned from the Australian divergence from the UK approach in the application of the principles.  
The article concludes that reform is ideal as a practical way forward but notes that obstacles to 
reform may mean that it is premature to discard the Morton principles. 
How the Principles Operate: The UK Approach  
It is convenient to begin by setting out the Morton principles: 
(1)  If the clause contains language which expressly exempts the person in whose favour it is made 
(‘the proferens’)3 from the consequence of the negligence of his own servants, effect must be 
given to that provision… 
(2)  If there is no express reference to negligence, the court must consider whether the words used 
are wide enough, in their ordinary meaning, to cover negligence on the part of the servants of 
the proferens. If a doubt arises at this point, it must be resolved against the proferens …  
(3)  If the words used are wide enough for the above purpose, the court must then consider whether 
"the head of damage may be based on some ground other than that of negligence," …4 The 
"other ground" must not be so fanciful or remote that the proferens cannot be supposed to have 
desired protection against it; but subject to this qualification, … the existence of a possible 
head of damage other than that of negligence is fatal to the proferens even if the words used 
are prima facie wide enough to cover negligence on the part of his servants. (Canada 
Steamship Lines Ltd v The King [1952] 1 AC 192, 208 (Canada Steamship)) 
The UK courts have applied the Morton principles since at least the 1960s (Walters v Whessoe Ltd 
and Shell Refining Co Ltd 18 November 1960 6 BLR 23, 36–7 (Slade J); AMF International Ltd v 
Magnet Bowling Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1028, 1055 (Mocatta J)). Indeed, principles of construction 
enunciated in the English decision of Rutter v Palmer [1922] 2 KB 87, 92 (Scruttons LJ) (Court of 
Appeal) (Rutter), and expanded in Alderslade v Hendon Laundry, Limited [1945] 1 KB 189, 192 
(Lord Greene) (Alderslade), were the forerunners of the Morton principles. 
The Morton principles will be considered under the following headings: 
i. scope and status of application – specifically when the principles apply and whether 
application is mandatory; 
ii. procedure in application – when each principle is triggered; and 
iii. substantive application – how the principles apply in substance. 
As mentioned, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Marina Centre adopted the UK approach as 
did other lower courts in Singapore. The UK approach set out below has been applied in Singapore 
unless stated otherwise. 
Status and Scope of Application 
Pertaining to scope, the Morton principles apply to the construction of indemnity clauses as much 
as to exclusion clauses (Smith v South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 165, 172G (Lord 
Fraser) (House of Lords) (Smith); CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55, 63–4 [22]–[23]; Jurong Port 
[2009] 4 SLR(R) 53, 58–9 [8]). They also apply to limitation of liability clauses, albeit not in their 
full rigour (Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 964 (Ailsa Craig); 
Rapiscan [2002] 1 SLR(R) 701, 721–2 [61]; Emjay Enterprises Pte Ltd v Skylift Consolidator (Pte) 
Ltd (Direct Services (HK) Ltd, third party) [2006] 2 SLR(R) 268, 273 [8] (Andrew Phang J) (Emjay)). 
There is recent suggestion that they would also not apply in their full rigour to exclusion or 
limitation clauses in contracts between commercial parties of equal bargaining power where risk 
allocation is the norm (Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup & Partners Ltd [2015] EWHC 3573 
                                                          
 
3  In EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe [1994] 1 WLR 221, 227F–G, Hobhouse J’s definition of a ‘proferens’ as 
‘the party … responsible for the preparation of the contract and/or who is to benefit from the provision’, was adopted by 
the Singapore High Court in CST Cleaning & Trading Pte Ltd v National Parks Board [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55, 63 [23]. 
4  Quoting Lord Greene in Alderslade v Hendon Laundry, Limited [1945] 1 KB 189, 192. 
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(TCC), at [22]–[33] (Stuart-Smith J) (Persimmon Homes)).5 Though not mentioned in Lord Morton’s 
enunciation of principle 1, the principles would apply where the clause excluded or indemnified 
against the proferens’ own negligence liability apart from that of his or her servants (Gillespie Bros 
& Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] 1 QB 400, 419E (Buckley LJ) (Court of Appeal) 
(Gillespie); Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897; CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55). 
As to status, the Morton principles are merely guidelines to interpretation and not to be applied 
as rigidly as statutory provisions (Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, 168H (Viscount Dilhorne); Marina 
Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 902 [8]). Nevertheless, given their authoritative weight, the courts 
cannot simply refuse to apply the principles in the appropriate case (Transcript of Proceedings 
(Lexis), E Scott (Plant Hire) Ltd v British Waterways Board (Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 1978 
E No 915, 20 December 1982) 12 (Oliver J), 13 (Slade LJ), 17 (Stephenson LJ) (E Scott); Marina 
Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 902–3 [8]–[10]). 
Procedure in Application  
The plain wording of the Morton principles indicates the sequence of application. Where principle 1 
is satisfied, the protection sought avails the proferens and resort to principles 2 or 3 is unnecessary. 
If principle 1 is not satisfied, the inquiry proceeds to principle 2. Failure to satisfy principle 2 leaves 
the proferens unprotected and the inquiry ends there. If principle 2 is satisfied, however, the 
inquiry must still proceed to principle 3 to determine if the desired protection is available. UK 
courts follow this approach (Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, 172G–174H (Lord Fraser); Gillespie [1973] 1 
QB 400, 420C–E (Buckley LJ) and HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan 
Bank [2003] 1 CLC 358, 380–3 [58]–[67] (Lord Hoffman), 395–7 [112]–[117] (Lord Scott) (HIH)), as 
do most – but perhaps not all – Singapore courts (Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 903–17 [11]–
[47] and Rapiscan [2002] 1 SLR(R) 701, 716–9 [45]–[53], 719–20 [54]–[56] and 721 [58]).6 
Substantive Application 
Underlying rationale and overarching themes 
Buckley LJ succinctly expressed the rationale and policy approach to construction that underpins 
the Morton principles in Gillespie [1973] 1 QB 400 as follows (at 419C–D):7  
[I]t is inherently improbable that one party to the contract should intend to absolve the other 
party from the consequences of the latter’s own negligence. The intention to do so must 
therefore be made perfectly clear, for otherwise the court will conclude that the exempted party 
was only intended to be free from liability in respect of damage occasioned by causes other 
than negligence for which he is answerable. 
Thus, English courts opined that the Morton principles would likely place a heavier burden on 
the proferens seeking to rely on indemnity clauses as it would be even more inherently improbable 
that a contracting party would agree to shoulder the negligence liability of the other (Smith [1978] 
1 WLR 165, 168D–E (Viscount Dilhorne), 178E (Lord Keith)).8 In the case of limitation clauses, the 
oft-stated rationale for not applying the Morton principles as stringently was that it would not be 
inherently improbable that a contracting party would agree to limit, as opposed to absolving the 
other party, of his or her negligence liability (Ailsa Craig [1983] 1 WLR 964, 970C–F (Lord Fraser)). 
It is pertinent to highlight that this rationale has been doubted, as a clause limiting liability to a 
negligible sum would, in practical terms, be more akin to an exclusion clause (Darlington Futures 
Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500, 510 [16] (High Court) (Darlington); BHP 
                                                          
5  A UK High Court decision handed down on 7 December 2015 and yet to be referred to by Singapore courts at the time 
of writing. 
6  Singapore courts have not strictly followed, for example, CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55. 
7 For Singapore authorities adopting, see, for example, Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 913–4 [37] and Rapiscan 
[2002] 1 SLR(R) 701, 716–7 [44]–[45]. 
8  For Singapore authorities adopting, see, for example, CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55, 63–4 [22]–[23].  
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Petroleum Ltd v British Steel Plc [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 133, 143–44 [43] (Evans LJ) (Court of 
Appeal); HIH [2003] 1 CLC 358, 381 [63] (Lord Hoffman) (House of Lords); Emjay [2006] 2 SLR(R) 
268, 279–80 [24] (Andrew Phang J)).9 Nevertheless, an absence of such inherent improbability in 
contracts between businesses of equal bargaining power accustomed to protecting their respective 
interests through the allocation of risks was recently regarded by an English High Court as reason 
for not applying the Morton principles as stringently to exclusion or limitation clauses (Persimmon 
Homes [2015] EWHC 3573 (TCC) at [22]–[33]).10 
Given the Morton principles’ emphasis on clarity of intention, construction contra proferentem 
is relevant to the principles’ policy function. Lord Morton’s principle 2 provides for any doubt 
arising from the interpretation of a clause to be resolved against the party who has stipulated (the 
proferens), and in favour of the party who has contracted the obligation.11 Lord Morton clearly had 
in mind the paradigm situation to which the contra proferentem rule applies, that is, where a 
clause benefits the party stipulating it but not the party contracting it.  
English courts characterised the Morton principles as particular applications of wider general 
principles of construction that included the contra proferentem rule (Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, 
178D (Lord Keith)). Lord Morton premised a less favourable construction to the proferens, however, 
upon doubt whereas the traditional formulation of the contra proferentem rule premised it on 
ambiguity. This was noted by Australian academics who have opined that the contra proferentem 
rule operated implicitly in principle 2 and the word ‘doubt’ must refer to ‘ambiguity’, for otherwise 
the scope for application of the contra proferentem rule would be unduly enlarged (Carter, 1995: 
81–82 and 96; Courtney, 2008: 194). 
Where the clause falls outside the paradigm situation, as in EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co 
Europe [1994] 1 WLR 221, which concerned a clause that was of mutual benefit to both contracting 
parties. Hobhouse J held that the ‘inherently improbable’ principle was still applicable, even 
though the contra proferentem rule was not. This led him to observe that the Morton principles 
overlap with, but were not the same as, the contra proferentem rule (at 227, F–H).12  
Hobhouse J’s approach accords with the notion that the Morton principles are mere guidelines 
to interpretation that do not require rigid adherence. His observation of a mere overlap highlights 
the primary objective of the construction exercise, that of requiring clarity of intention. It does not 
suggest that the contra proferentem rule plays no part in the application of the Morton principles. 
Thus, in the paradigm situation, the contra proferentum rule should still apply in the event of 
ambiguity, in line with principle 2. 
A contextual approach is apposite to the ascertainment of the contracting parties’ intention and 
has been emphasised by the English courts in the application of the Morton principles. 13  In 
Singapore, the contextual approach applies to the interpretation of any contract term (Zurich 
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 
1029, 1087 [114] and 1090–4 [121]–[130] (VK Rajah J)) (Zurich Insurance)14 and is followed in the 
application of the Morton principles. UK and Singapore case examples illustrating this are raised 
as each principle is discussed below. 
                                                          
9  The Australian High Court in Darlington refused to follow the Ailsa Craig approach for this reason. 
10  See the concern raised about an overly strict application of the principles highlighted under the heading, ‘The Gaps in 
the UCTA’. 
11  Lord Morton referred to article 1019 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which stated this in substantially the same 
words. 
12  This case was cited with approval by the Singapore High Court in CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55, 63 [22], although 
it is unclear if the context in which Lord Hobhouse made his observation was fully appreciated. 
13  For indemnity and exclusion clauses, see Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, 177H (Lord Keith). For limitation clauses, see Ailsa 
Craig [1983] 1 WLR 964, 966G (Lord Wilberforce). For all other contract terms, see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd 
v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
14  The Court of Appeal affirmed the application of the contextual approach to the interpretation of contract terms 
including exclusion clauses.  
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Satisfying principle 1 
Principle 1 directs attention to whether the contracting parties have, in their clause, expressed a 
clear intention to protect the proferens or his agents against negligence liability. If expressed 
intention exists, the clause is upheld and the protection avails the proferens. 
Expressed intention is evident if the clause clearly refers to negligence by the use of the word 
‘negligent’ or ‘negligence’ or a word synonymous with negligence. Hence, clauses containing the 
following phrases have failed to satisfy principle 1: ‘[a]ny liability, loss, claim or proceedings 
whatsoever under statute or common law’ (Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, 173B–D (Lord Fraser), 179D 
(Lord Keith)); ‘any damage …which may arise from or be in any way connected with any act or 
omission’ (The Raphael; Lamport & Holt Lines Ltd v Coubro & Scruttons (M&I) Ltd [1982] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 42, 45 (Donaldson LJ), 48 (May LJ) (The Raphael)); and ‘any damage whatsoever’ 
(Transcript of Proceedings (Lexis), E Scott (Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 1978 E No 915, 20 
December 1982) 10 (Oliver J) obiter) or ‘however arising’ (Transcript of Proceedings (Lexis), E Scott 
(Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 1978 E No 915, 20 December 1982) 10 (Oliver J) obiter). 
The Singapore Court of Appeal in Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897 followed this approach, 
holding that the exclusion clause 36.1(b), containing neither the word ‘negligence’ nor a synonym, 
did not expressly exempt the proferens from negligence liability (at 903 [13]). 
To ascertain expressed intention under principle 1, the context of the clause within the 
contractual document and the factual matrix of the transaction would be relevant to ascribe 
meaning to the words, including the interpretation of a synonym. In Hong Realty [1994] 2 SLR(R) 
90, the factual circumstances in which the claimant agreed to the exclusion clause in a contract for 
storage services were pivotal to the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision on the effectiveness of the 
clause. At the time of contracting, the warehouse was a place fit for storage of the claimant’s goods. 
Subsequent to contracting, piping works undertaken rendered the warehouse unfit, due to the 
warehouse owner’s negligent failure to take precautions resulting in damage to the claimant’s 
goods. The court held that the exclusion clauses should only apply to the particular circumstances 
the parties had in mind at the time the contract was entered into. Thus, although the exclusion 
clauses were worded to expressly exclude the negligence liability of the warehouse owner, they 
were inapplicable (at 96–8 [16]–[19]). 
Where expressed intention is absent, such as where general words are used in the clause in 
question, principles 2 and 3 prescribe guidelines for ascertaining the parties’ presumed intention 
(Carter, 1995: 79–84). 
Satisfying principle 2 
As mentioned, principle 2 is engaged to determine the contracting parties’ presumed intention, that 
is, what parties are assumed to have in mind at the time of contracting, rather than what they 
actually had in mind. An objective approach is taken as parties may not have even addressed their 
minds to the matter (Carter, 1995: 73, 74 and 80). To do this, principle 2 requires scrutiny of the 
words of the clause to determine if their ordinary meaning encompasses negligence liability. If it is 
clearly capable of embracing negligence liability, principle 2 is satisfied and resort to principle 3 
comes next. If there is ambiguity, the contra proferentem rule is applied to read down the scope of 
protection afforded to the proferens. If negligence liability is not embraced by the clause when read 
down, the proferens is unprotected and the inquiry stops there.  
The context of the clause again provides the background for attributing meaning to the words 
of the clause. Thus, the House of Lords in Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165, considered the wording of the 
whole (indemnity) clause (clause 23) and not just the part relied upon by the proferens. The court 
held that the opening words of part (b), the part relied upon (‘Any liability, loss, claim or 
proceedings whatsoever under statute or common law…’) should be read in light of the introductory 
words of clause 23 and the concluding words of part (b). So read, the words did not encompass the 
proferens’ negligence liability despite the width of the wording. This is contrary to the conclusion 
that might have been reached if they had been construed in isolation (at 173D–174F (Lord Fraser); 
178F–179D (Lord Keith)).  
Australian Journal of Asian Law  Vol 17 No 1 
6 
In Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered the wording 
of clause 36.1(b) and held that the qualifying words ‘unless caused by wilful misconduct of the 
Landlord or its officers…’ meant that the shopping mall owner-landlord’s negligence liability under 
the lease agreement was excluded (at 907–8 [22]). Even so, the court went on to consider part (a) of 
clause 36.1, indemnity clause 17.2, and the factual context of the lease agreement to confirm such 
presumed intent (at 912–3 [32]–[35]).15  
It may be noted that the Privy Council in Canada Steamship [1952] 1 AC 192 applied the 
contra proferentem rule to an ambiguous indemnity clause to prefer the narrower interpretation 
advanced by the tenant over the broader one advanced by the landlord-proferens. The court 
doubted that the parties intended the landlord-proferens to be entitled to an indemnity even where 
its employees had been negligent in carrying out its express repair obligations under the lease (at 
212–13). 
Satisfying principle 3 
Principle 3 is the most controversial of the principles as it prescribes an approach in words that 
appear strongly biased against the proferens in presuming the parties’ intention. Principle 3 forbids 
an immediate conclusion that the clause protects against negligence liability even where the 
contextual meaning of the words were capable of such interpretation under principle 2. The court is 
directed to consider further whether the clause was intended to protect against heads of liability 
other than negligence. The existence of these would be ‘fatal’ to the proferens. This is only qualified 
by the need to ensure that the other heads of liability ‘must not be so fanciful or remote that the 
proferens cannot be supposed to have desired protection against it’.  
Despite this, English courts have consistently eschewed a mechanical (and literal) application 
of principle 3, preferring a contextual construction of the clause (Carter, 1995: 84; HIH [2003] 1 
CLC 358, 396–97 [116]–[117] (Lord Scott)).16 This is apparent from the historical development of 
principle 3 in Rutter and Alderslade. It was held in Rutter [1922] 2 KB 87 that the proferens’ 
possible liabilities in the particular transaction must be ascertained before considering the scope of 
the exclusion; and that the clause would ‘more readily’ be construed to cover negligence liability 
where this was the proferens’ only liability (at 92 (Scrutton LJ)). In Alderslade [1945] 1 KB 189, 
Lord Greene, restated the rule, using the mandatory word ‘must’ in place of ‘more readily’ (at 192). 
Subsequent English decisions (Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71, 78F–81B 
(Salmon LJ) (Hollier); The Raphael [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42, 49–50 (May LJ)) and the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Sim Jwee Kiat v City Car Rentals & Tours Pte Ltd [1990] 2 SLR(R) 110, 113–14 
[8] preferred the words ‘should usually’ over ‘must’ in the rule in Rutter, reiterating the need to 
consider contextual factors in the construction of contract terms rather than to follow a rigid rule.  
Lord Greene in Alderslade also expanded the rule in Rutter to provide that the existence of 
other heads of liability will require the clause to be confined to those heads of liability and not 
negligence (at 192). His dictum was adopted as principle 3 by Lord Morton in Canada Steamship 
[1952] 1 AC 192 who added the caveat that the other heads of liability must not be ‘fanciful and 
remote’ (at 208). 
On the question of when the other heads of liability would be considered ‘fanciful or remote’, 
the English Court of Appeal in The Raphael [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 42 clarified that this depended on 
the intention of the parties at the time of contracting – specifically, whether they intended to 
include these heads of liability within the scope of the clause. A factual standpoint using the 
officious bystander test was apposite in determining what parties must have had in mind. A 
legalistic view was inappropriate as lay parties would not appreciate the finer points of the law (at 
45–7 (Donaldson LJ), 50 (May LJ)). May LJ thus warned against a detailed examination of when 
                                                          
15  Also to establish the precise scope of exclusion (whether it was the tenant or third parties’ loss that was excluded). 
16  Carter observed: ‘[T]he Privy Council in the Canada SS case was overstating the position … The existence of a possible 
head of damage other than negligence is not 'fatal' to the application of the clause to negligence’. See English 
authorities cited by Carter at n 55.In HIH, Lord Scott said ‘It cannot be right mechanically to apply the guideline 
incorporated in his third paragraph so as to produce a result inconsistent with the commercial purpose of the contract 
in question.’ 
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legal liability would or would not arise (at 50) and Donaldson LJ dismissed the likelihood of lay 
contracting parties contemplating a clause to protect against a contractual liability but not a 
tortious one if the same breach was capable of giving rise to both (at 46). 
The following cases illustrate the preference for a contextual approach to principle 3 in 
determining whether the clause protected against negligence liability, as well as whether non-
negligence liabilities were fanciful and remote.  
In HIH [2003] 1 CLC 358, the House of Lords held that a truth of statement clause (an 
exclusion clause) in the insurance policies in question was intended to protect the assured-
proferens against its agents’ negligence, even though there were non-negligence liabilities (for 
innocent non-disclosure and innocent misrepresentation) that the exclusion clause would clearly 
cover (at 381 [60]–[63] and 383 [67] (Lord Hoffman); 396–97 [116]–[117] (Lord Scott)). The 
existence of these other heads of liabilities was not considered ‘fatal’ to the assured-proferens in 
light of the factual matrix and commercial purpose of the insurance contracts concerned.  
The assured was a financier of films whose risk against shortfalls or failure in repayment of 
loans made to film producers was insured. The brokers who procured the policies on its behalf had 
intimate knowledge of the commercial prospects of the films and the risk of non-repayment but the 
assured did not. For this reason, the exclusion clause was inserted into the policies to protect the 
assured from prejudicial acts or omissions of the brokers in procuring the policies. Under the 
circumstances, the court held that the commercial objectives of the exclusion clause would be 
substantially undermined if it did not provide protection to the assured against negligent 
misrepresentations or negligent non-disclosure of their brokers apart from innocent ones (383 [67] 
(Lord Hoffman), 397 [117] (Lord Scott)). 
In Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered the factual 
and legal context in holding the exclusion clause 36.1(b) to be intended to protect the landlord-
proferens against negligence liability, and in dismissing other non-negligent heads of liability 
suggested by counsel for the tenants (for breach of covenants for quiet enjoyment and repair, 
nuisance and under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher) as fanciful and remote. The tenant had sued the 
shopping mall owner-landlord for water damage to goods kept in its leased shop unit. An air-
conditioning pipe within the false ceiling above a neighbouring shop unit had burst and leaked 
water which subsequent seeped into the tenant’s shop unit.  
The court found that, factually, the events of breaches listed in clause 36.1(b) – ‘short circuit of 
electrical wiring, explosion, falling plaster, leaks from gas, electricity, water sprinkler, rain 
plumbing or other pipe and sewerage system, and leaks from the roof, street or subsurface’ – 
necessarily involved negligence on the part of the landlord (at 914 [39]). This implied that the 
parties must have contemplated protection for the landlord against its negligence liability and 
meant that only the landlord’s negligent breach of the covenants for repair and quiet enjoyment (at 
914 [39 would come within the scope of the protection. The court opined that the parties could not 
have intended to absolve the landlord from liability for deliberate breaches of express undertakings 
for repair and quiet enjoyment unless such intent was made clear (at 915 [42]). The court then 
noted the law on when a landlord’s legal liability would arise for nuisance or breach of the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher – notably, that where the utilities, systems and structures of the shopping mall 
were maintained for the tenant’s benefit, the law would deem the tenant to have consented to their 
existence and availability from the start of the lease and, as such, the landlord would bear no 
liability unless it had been negligent (at 915–7 [43]–[46]). 
The Court of Appeal in Marina Centre did not apply the approach in The Raphael faithfully in 
determining whether the non-negligent heads of liability were fanciful or remote. Although it took 
the factual standpoint (in considering the wording of clause 36.1(b) against the factual context and 
other express terms in the lease agreement), the court also considered when liability would attach 
under the law for nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (at 915–7 [43]–[46]), contrary 
to what was suggested by May LJ in The Raphael. This could be because the court in Marina 
Centre only considered dicta in The Raphael on the status of the Morton principles and how 
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principle 1 might be satisfied. 17  Another plausible reason could be that it is not wholly 
inappropriate to consider the law if the facts show that the contract was drafted by lawyers and the 
parties had the benefit of legal advice on the terms of their agreement, as could have been the case 
in Marina Centre which involved two commercial parties. 
How the Principles are Applied: Current Singapore Law 
The manner Singapore courts have, in more recent times, applied the Morton principles in the 
decisions of CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 55 and Jurong Port [2009] 4 SLR(R) 53 is now 
examined. Both cases involved poorly drafted indemnity provisions in contracts between business 
entities. The issue before the Singapore High court in each case was whether the indemnity 
provisions protected the proferens from liability caused by its own negligence (in CST Cleaning) or 
its employee’s negligence (in Jurong Port).  
In CST Cleaning, the National Parks Board had contracted with CST Cleaning for the latter to 
provide cleaning services to a public park. CST Cleaning hired a sub-contractor to do the job. The 
sub-contractor’s employee collided into a young boy cycling on a footpath at the park when driving 
a lorry. Both the Board and the sub-contractor’s employee were held jointly liable for negligently18 
causing the boy’s injuries; with each liable for the whole indivisible damage. The Board paid the 
compensation in full and claimed an indemnity for the whole sum from CST Cleaning, relying on 
an indemnity clause in their contract. The indemnity provision (at 58 [7])19 expressly entitled the 
Board-proferens to an indemnity where the other contracting party or his sub-contractor had been 
negligent but was silent on whether the proferens was so entitled when it was concurrently liable 
in negligence for the same loss (at 66 [30]).  
In Jurong Port, Jurong Port’s employee negligently caused an industrial accident at the port 
facility resulting in the death of an employee of the construction contractor hired by Jurong Port. 
Jurong Port settled the claim brought by the deceased’s estate and claimed an indemnity from the 
construction contractor for the sums paid under numerous indemnity clauses in the contract 
between them. The indemnity provisions (at 55–6 [2])20 were silent on whether the negligence of 
Jurong Port’s employee entitled the proferens, Jurong Port, to an indemnity from the other 
contracting party (at 59–60 [9]–[13]). 
Both decisions made reference to the Marina Centre decision (CST Cleaning [2009] 1 SLR(R) 
55, 63–4 [23]; Jurong Port [2009] 4 SLR(R) 53, 58 [7]) but did not explain the application of each 
Morton principle to the facts as did the Singapore Court of Appeal in Marina Centre. In fact, in 
CST Cleaning, the Morton principles were applied collectively as the ‘inherently improbable’ 
principle of construction with neither explicit mention of each principle nor the sequence of 
application (at 63–4 [23], 66 [29] and 69–70 [38]). In Jurong Port, the High Court noted the district 
judge’s express application of each Morton principle in the court below (at 57–8 [4]–[5]) but went on 
to apply principles 1 and 2 implicitly (at 59–61 [9]–[14])21 while expressly declaring principle 3 to 
be inapplicable on the facts (at 61 [15]).  
Both decisions used language that tended to confuse as to the precise Morton principle being 
applied. In CST Cleaning, the court described as ‘too fanciful’ an interpretation that totally 
disentitled the proferens from any indemnity as long as it had been negligent despite the other 
contracting party’s subcontractor being concurrently negligent (at 66 [29]). The phrase ‘too fanciful’ 
is usually associated with principle 3. Yet, had the court applied each Morton principle in turn, it 
                                                          
17  Marina Centre [1997] 2 SLR(R) 897, 902 [9] and 905 [16]. 
18  Alternatively, the Board was found to have breached its duty as occupier.  
19  For wording of the indemnity provision relied upon, see clause 22(a). 
20  For wording of indemnity provisions relied upon, see Condition 13(1), Specifications 23b and 23e. For those that 
purported to aid in their construction, see Condition 13(2) and (4), Specifications 23a and 26. 
21  The court implicitly applied principle 1 at 59 [9] and 60 [13] in noting that the words of the clauses relied upon did not 
expressly cover Jurong Port or its employees’ negligence; and at 59–61 [9]–[14], the court implicitly applied principle 2 
in considering the language of the clauses and how they might be understood in relation to other clauses in the contract 
before resolving ambiguity against the proferens. 
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would have been apparent that principle 3 would not have been triggered at all,22 so the use of the 
phrase is potentially confusing.  
In Jurong Port, the court held that resort to principle 3 is redundant once the indemnity 
provisions, being ambiguous, were read down using the contra proferentem rule together with the 
inherently improbable principle (at 61 [15]). The inherently improbable principle being the 
rationale underpinning all three Morton principles, it would have promoted semantic clarity if the 
court had highlighted instead that the contra proferentem rule was applied in principle 2 in line 
with the rationale. The court also used language evocative of principle 3 in applying what must 
have been principle 2, having declared principle 3 inapplicable on the facts. The court considered 
heads of liability other than the negligence of Jurong Port or its employees that Condition 13(1), 
one of the indemnity provisions relied upon, could have been intended to cover (at 59–60 [9]). This 
is confusing but also a point of some interest, given academic comment critical of distinguishing 
principles 2 and 3.23 
Both decisions, however, confirm the relevance of a contextual approach to ascertaining the 
contracting parties’ presumed intention. In CST Cleaning, this was apparent when the court took 
account of how commercial parties would have approached construction of the indemnity provision 
(at 69 [37]), while in Jurong Port the court referred to other clauses in construing the indemnity 
provisions relied upon and considered alternative heads of liability that Condition 13(1) could have 
been intended to cover (at 59–61 [9]–[14]).  
The sequence of first attempting to discover the express intention of the contracting parties 
before moving on to ascertain their presumed intention was adhered to by the court in CST 
Cleaning (at 68–9 [34]–[37]). The court in Jurong Port followed this sequence in its implicit 
application of principles 1 and 2.  
In sum, despite some redeeming points, these cases indicate a want of clarity in their 
application of the Morton principles.  
Utility of the Principles  
It remains to examine if the Morton principles continue to be of utility in Singapore. Relevant 
considerations include their ease of application and whether they fill a gap in the protection of 
vulnerable contracting parties under the Unfair Contract Terms Act (Singapore, Cap 396, 1994 Rev 
Ed). The Australian divergence from the UK approach is also interesting and will be considered 
first to see if it provides cogent reasons for a similar divergence on Singapore’s part.  
The Australian Divergence 
The Australian High Court in Darlington (1986) 161 CLR 500 adopted the principle of ‘commercial’ 
construction. It followed the House of Lords’ decision in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport 
Ltd [1980] AC 827 (Photo Production), which argued against strained construction of exclusion 
clauses in favour of respecting clearly expressed risk allocations of commercial parties of equal 
bargaining power, especially where risks were usually insured (at 843 (Lord Wilberforce); at 851 
(Lord Diplock)). Carter wryly observed that these decisions, though not involving the application of 
the Morton principles, led to suggestions in Australia that they were inconsistent with commercial 
construction and redundant (Carter, 1995: 71–2).  
Notably, principle 3 had been derided as an ‘artificial and inflexible rule of interpretation’ that 
would likely frustrate the intentions of parties entering into a commercial contract (Valkonen and 
                                                          
22  On the author’s analysis, application of principle 1 would certainly have led to the conclusion that there was no express 
intention to entitle the proferens to an indemnity in respect of its negligence, since there was no clear reference to such 
in the clause’s wording. Principle 2 would then be triggered requiring ascertainment of the parties’ presumed intention. 
A contextual construction of the wording of the clause must be undertaken to determine if they were wide enough to 
entitle the proferens to an indemnity, with any ambiguity to be resolved against the proferens. Construction contra 
proferentem requires choosing the narrower of viable constructions, that is, that the proferens was not entitled to claim 
an indemnity to the extent its negligence had caused the loss. Thus settled, resort to principle 3 would not have been 
necessary. 
23  See discussion of this point under the heading ‘Ease of Application’ below. 
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Anor v Jennings Construction Ltd and Ors (1995) LSJS 87, 98 [34] (Cox J) (Valkonen).24 The 
controversy over principle 3 came to a head in relation to an indemnity clause relied upon to 
exclude the proferens’ negligence liability in Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd [2004] 217 
CLR 424 (Andar). In contrast to the court below, which declared principle 3 no longer the law in 
Australia for interpreting indemnity (as well as exclusion and limitation) clauses (Brambles Ltd v 
Wail; Brambles Ltd v Andar Transport Pty Ltd (2002) 5 VR 169, 191 [69] and [70] (Winneke P, 
Charles JA and Batt JA)), the High Court omitted mention of the Morton principles and applied a 
rule of strict construction (usually applied in contracts of guarantee) instead (Andar [2004] 217 
CLR 424, 433 [17] and 437 [23] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ)). 
Australian academics argued that, notwithstanding the silence, the Morton principles were 
implicitly applied (Carter & Yates, 2004: 244).25 They criticised the High court for missing the 
opportunity to clarify the principles’ status in Australia (Carter & Yates, 2004:244; Gosewisch, 
2006: 97 and 104). They were also critical of the other rule, arguing that the Morton principles 
(including principle 3) were more relevant and useful for interpreting indemnity clauses if applied 
in a commercial way (Carter & Yates, 2004: 236–37, 244–46).  
The New South Wales Court of Appeal, however, in BI (Contracting) Pty Ltd v AW 
Baulderstone Holdings Pty Ltd (2008) Aust Contract Reports 90-267 (BI (Contracting)) regarded 
the High Court’s decision in Andar as signaling principle 3’s demise in relation to construction of 
indemnity clauses in Australia. Despite noting the Morton principles’ continued application in the 
UK (at 90,165–90, 167 [81]–[84]) and academics’ criticisms of the High Court decision (at 90,167 
[85]–[87]), the court so held because of:  
i. the High Court’s silence on the Morton principles in Andar (at 90, 168 [94]); 
ii. the perceived inconsistency between principle 3 and the High Court’s approach in Andar 
– the court regarded principle 3 as requiring a search for ambiguity first instead of 
reading a clause strictly first before resolving ambiguities, if any, against the proferens 
(at 90, 168 [94]); and 
iii. the High Court’s apparent lack of express endorsement of principle 3 in all Australian 
cases where the Morton principles were considered, except in one instance in a 
dissenting judgment (at 90, 168 [92]).26 
The BI (Contracting) decision itself drew academic criticism for overstating the High Court’s 
lack of endorsement (Courtney, 2008: 193–4). Courtney also argued that principle 3 did not require 
a search for ambiguity as the first step, it being triggered only after the clause had passed a strict 
interpretation established under principle 2 (Courtney, 2008: 194).  
Courtney noted that principle 3 was flawed in the manner it measured the degree of inherent 
improbability that protection against negligence liability was intended but recommended flexibility 
in application rather than abandonment. He noted that the existence of other heads of liability was 
a relevant but inconclusive factor and highlighted other potentially relevant considerations – the 
agreed compensation for the indemnitor relative to his potential exposure to indemnity liability, 
prevailing industry practice on whether indemnities are expected to cover the proferens’ negligence 
liability, and the rise in instances of statutory liability (Courtney, 2008: 194–5).  
                                                          
24  Cox J’s oft-cited criticism of principle 3 is as follows:  
 ‘The solicitude for the indemnifying party which explains [principle 3]'s creation will often be inappropriate in modern 
commercial conditions. There may be good practical reasons for providing that one party to a contract shall be 
indemnified by the other against any liability the former might incur to a third party, even if it is caused by his own 
fault, and where, as commonly happens, the obligation to indemnify is to be secured by insurance (as in the case of this 
contract) there is no sound policy reason for expecting the contract term to conform with an arbitrary judge-made 
textual requirement before its provisions will be given their natural operation. Indeed, a narrow interpretation of such 
a term is likely in any given case to benefit only the insurance company which writes the obligatory policy in prudently 
liberal terms and charges appropriately for it.’ 
25  By contrast, Gosewisch, 2006: 97 argues that the High Court did not have such intent. See Transcript of Proceedings, 
Tempo Services Ltd v State of New South Wales (High Court of Australia, 39, Gleeson CJ & Heydon J, 2 November 
2005), cited by Gosewich, where the High Court declined to provide further elucidation of its decision in Andar and the 
applicability of the Morton principles to the construction of exclusion, limitation and indemnity clauses, despite a 
special leave application made to it seeking clarification. 
26  For the exception see Thomas National Transport (Melbourne) Pty Ltd v May & Baker (Australia) Pty Ltd (1966) 115 
CLR 353, 376–7 (Windeyer J). 
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The foregoing shows that while Australian courts have moved away from applying principle 3 
to indemnity clauses, Australian academics continue to argue for its relevance if applied flexibly 
and with due regard for context. Singapore courts have always applied the Morton principles 
contextually. Thus, the Australian experience alone does not provide particularly compelling 
reasons for a similar move by Singapore courts. On the other hand, Courtney highlighted factors 
useful for a more considered application of principle 3.  
The Gaps in the UCTA 
The Morton principles were laid down when legislation protecting contracting parties against 
unreasonable exclusion, limitation or indemnity clauses was unavailable in the UK. With the 
passing of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK, c 50) (UK UCTA), English courts often warned 
against an overly strict application of the Morton principles, especially principle 3 (HIH [2003] 1 
CLC 358, 381–2 [63] (Lord Hoffman)). Their main concern was to prevent a strained and unnatural 
construction of the clauses in order to achieve justice for the vulnerable party (George Mitchell 
(Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 1 QB 284, 297D–299F (Lord Denning) (Court of 
Appeal); [1983] 2 AC 803, 812G–4D (Lord Bridge) (House of Lords)). They were also concerned to 
avoid an interpretation that subverts the intentions of ‘commercial contracting parties of equal 
bargaining status’ who are each ‘capable of looking after their own interests and of deciding how 
risks inherent in the … contract can be most economically borne (Photo Production [1980] AC 827, 
851 (Lord Diplock)). As noted above, the latter concern was the basis for Australian criticism of the 
Morton principles and rejection of principle 3. Most recently, this concern was re-emphasised in 
Persimmon Homes [2015] EWHC 3573 (TCC). The UK High Court, while accepting (at [30]–[32]) 
the Morton principles as useful guidelines for interpretation when applied flexibly and with regard 
to context, suggested (at [25]–[28]) that increasing recognition and respect for the considered risk 
allocations of commercial contracting parties of equal bargaining power would limit the relevance 
of principle 3.27   
The UK UCTA applies with minor modifications28 in Singapore by virtue of the Application of 
English Law Act (Singapore, Cap 7A 2012 Rev Ed) (AELA).29 The local enactment, Unfair Contract 
Terms Act (Singapore, Cap 396, 1994 Rev Ed) (UCTA), regulates exclusion, limitation or indemnity 
clauses by either prohibiting reliance upon them altogether or allowing reliance subject to their 
passing a test of reasonableness.30 In terms of scope, the UCTA regulates clauses that exclude or 
restrict business liability31 thus applying mainly to contracts between businesses (B2B) and where 
a business supplies to a consumer (B2C). 
In respect of B2B contracts, the UCTA differentiates between clauses found in the proferens’ 
written standard terms and those that are not.32 Where the contracting parties are businesses of 
unequal bargaining power typical in situations where a business ‘submits’ to the written standard 
terms of another, regulation is available. Clauses not found in the proferens’ written standard 
                                                          
27  In Geys v Societe Generale, London Branch [2013] 1 AC 523, 543 [37], Lord Hope in endorsing the Morton principles for 
the interpretation of an exclusion clause omitted mention of principle 3 altogether. Stuart-Smith J in Persimmon 
Homes [2015] EWHC 3573 (TCC) at [24] regarded the omission as ‘unlikely to be accidental’ even though the omission 
could have been due to Geys not involving negligence claims. Stuart-Smith J highlighted that principles 1 and 2 were 
‘consistent with the modern approach to interpretation’ (at [24]) and that ‘the Court’s task is essentially the same when 
interpreting … an exclusion clause or limitation clause as it is when interpreting any other provision of a contract’(at 
[33]). 
28  Parts of the UK Act  ̶  s 8, which amends s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act, and Part II which comprise provisions 
relating to Scotland  ̶  were omitted from the Singapore Act. 
29  See s 4(1)(a) and the First Schedule of the AELA. 
30  See, for example, s 2 of the UCTA, where reliance on clauses to exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury 
resulting from negligence is prohibited (s 2(1)) while reliance on clauses to exclude or restrict negligence liability for 
other loss or damage may be allowed if the clause satisfies the requirement of reasonableness (s 2(2)). 
31  Section 1(3) of the UCTA. 
32  See s 3(1) of the UCTA. 
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terms, unless regulated for excluding or restricting a negligence liability,33 or liability for breach of 
terms implied into contracts for the supply of goods,34 are outside the scope of the UCTA.  
‘Business’ under the UCTA is not defined but stated to include ‘a profession and the activities of 
any Government department or local or public authority’.35 Kidner in his article on the UK UCTA 
considered English authorities on what constituted a business and noted that commercial activity 
and profit motive are important indicators, though not essential elements, of a business (Kidner, 
1987: 53–4). Thus, a non-profit organisation that engages in regular commercial activity to raise 
funds for charity, like the Salvation Army Thrift Stores, may be regarded a business. A non-profit, 
private members’ club organising occasional excursions for its members may not. 
Yet, there is very limited regulation of private contracts (loosely labelled C2C)36 where neither 
party contracts in the course of a business. This is also the case for contracts where a private party 
supplies to a business (loosely, C2B) such as where an individual sells his used car to a second-
hand car dealer.37 If a private party exempts liability for his or her misrepresentation that induced 
the contract with the representee, the clause is regulated by the UCTA.38 Apart from this, only 
C2C or C2B contracts of sale or hire-purchase are regulated, with regulation extending only to 
clauses excluding or restricting liability for breach of certain terms implied by statute.39 
Where indemnity clauses are concerned, only those used against a consumer in B2C contracts 
are regulated.40 Indemnity clauses used in B2B contracts,41 such as those considered in the CST 
Cleaning and Jurong Port cases, and in C2C or C2B contracts, would fall outside the purview of the 
UCTA. 
In addition, certain types of contracts are completely excluded from the scope of the UCTA, 
regardless of whether they are B2B or B2C contracts or otherwise.42 Examples of these include 
insurance contracts; contracts relating to the creation, transfer and termination of an interest in 
land, or of a right or interest in intellectual property; and contracts relating to the creation or 
transfer of securities, or of rights or interests thereof. All international contracts for the supply of 
goods are similarly excluded.43 
Certain other types of contracts are regulated by the UCTA on a limited basis – B2C contracts 
of these types are fully regulated while only clauses excluding negligence liability resulting in 
                                                          
33  Section 2 regulates clauses that exclude or restrict negligence liability. 
34  Sections 6 and 7 regulate clauses that exclude or restrict liability for breach of terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 
(Singapore, Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed), the Hire-Purchase Act (Singapore, Cap 125, 2014 Rev Ed) and the Supply of Goods 
Act (Singapore, Cap 394, 1999 Rev Ed), as well as those implied by the common law in sale or supply of goods contracts 
not governed by these statutes. 
35  See s 14 of the UCTA. See also, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 1975 at para 203, where it is 
recommended that ‘activities in the exercise of a profession and the activities of government departments, local 
authorities and statutory undertakers’ be regarded as being ‘in the course of a business’ for the purposes of the UCTA. 
36  A private party dealing with another is not considered a consumer under the UCTA. Section 12(1) defines a consumer 
narrowly as one who ‘neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as doing so’ while the 
other party does, and further requires ‘goods passing under contracts governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-
purchase’ to be ones ‘ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’.  
37  See, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2005 at paras 6.14–6.16 and 6.20. 
38  Section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act (Singapore, Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) subjects the clause to a test of 
reasonableness under s 11(1) of the UCTA. 
39  See ss 1(3) and 6(4) of the UCTA. In these contracts, clauses excluding or restricting liability for breach of implied 
terms as to the seller’s title, the good’s freedom from undisclosed encumbrance and the buyer’s enjoyment of quiet 
possession under the Sale of Goods Act (Singapore, Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed) (SOGA), and corresponding provisions 
implied under the Hire-Purchase Act (Singapore, Cap 125, 2014 Rev Ed) (HPA), are prohibited: s 6(1) of the UCTA. 
Liability for implied terms of correspondence of goods with description and with sample under SOGA; and 
corresponding implied terms under HPA may only be excluded or restricted if reasonable: s 6(3) read with s 12 of the 
UCTA on definition of ‘dealing as consumer’. 
40  See s 4 of the UCTA which subjects the clause to the test of reasonableness.  
41  Although an indemnity clause that effectively excludes the proferens’ liability in requiring indemnity against losses 
suffered by the indemnifying ‘non-consumer’ party would likely be regulated under the UCTA: see Phang, 2012: 
[07.087] and [07.132] and Peel, 2011: [7–073]. 
42  See s 1(2) and First Schedule, ss 1(a) ̶ (e) of the UCTA. 
43  See s 26 of the UCTA. An example is an equipment leasing contract between a business based in Singapore and a 
business based in Malaysia where the equipment is to be delivered from Malaysia to Singapore for use: see ss 26(3) and 
26(4)(a) of the UCTA. 
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death or personal injury in such B2B contracts are regulated.44 Contracts for hire of a ship or for 
carriage of goods by ship are examples of such contracts.  
In employment contracts, the UCTA only regulates reliance by employers on clauses excluding 
or restricting negligence liability as against employees.45 Finally, the regulating sections of the 
UCTA would not apply to exclusion, limitation or indemnity clauses in contracts where the default 
governing law would have been the law of other countries (such as contracts involving parties and 
subject matter unconnected to Singapore) and Singapore law applies only because of an express 
choice of law clause in the contract.46  
It might be argued that in C2C contracts where the relationship between the contracting 
parties provides incentives against the use of such clauses,47 the gap does not pose much concern. 
In C2B contracts, it might be extremely rare for the private party to impose harsh terms on the 
business. Clearly, where legal advice would likely have been consulted before entry into, say, a B2C 
or B2B contract, or where adequate regulation exists under other laws, the gaps are not 
problematic.48 Policy reasons might exist for not imposing UCTA controls over contracts involving 
purely foreign parties49 or international contracts where local businesses supply goods to foreign 
buyers.50 
Subject to these, consumers in B2C contracts (whether domestic ones or international contracts 
where local consumers contract for the supply of goods from foreign suppliers) wholly excluded from 
the UCTA’s regulation are surely in a more vulnerable position compared to the businesses they 
deal with. Specific consumer protection legislation in Singapore, the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act (Singapore, Cap 52A, 2009 Rev Ed) (CPFTA, which regulates most of the excluded 
B2C contracts),51 only provides limited recourse to consumers who have been taken advantage of 
by the inclusion of ‘terms or conditions that are harsh, oppressive or excessively one-sided so as to 
be unconscionable’.52 Claims are limited to subject matter valued at not more than SGD30,000 or 
compensation not exceeding that amount. 53 This does not provide adequate protection to, for 
example, a consumer entering into an insurance contract, which would likely exceed SGD30,000 in 
subject matter in most cases.54 
A small business could equally be more vulnerable in relation to a big one in B2B contracts 
currently unregulated, whether in relation to indemnity clauses, or domestic contracts not based on 
the other businesses’ written standard terms or international ones where local businesses contract 
for the supply of goods from foreign suppliers. Is it likely that small businesses would invariably 
                                                          
44  See s 1(2) and First Schedule, ss 2 ̶ 3 of the UCTA.  
45  See 1(2) and First Schedule, s 4 of the UCTA. Section 2(1) bans clauses excluding negligence liability that results in 
death or personal injury, while s 2(2) subjects clauses excluding negligence liability resulting in other losses to a test of 
reasonableness. 
46  See s 27(1) of the UCTA. 
47  See, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 1975 at paras 9 and 201. 
48  For example, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Singapore, Cap 33, 1998 Rev Ed) and ss 134 to 138 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act (Singapore, Cap 179, 1996 Rev Ed) apply to regulate clauses affecting liability of carriers of goods or 
passengers, shipowners (including charterer, manager and operator of a seagoing ship or hovercraft) or salvors. Section 
8 of the Employment Act (Singapore, Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) renders ‘illegal, null and void’ any term specifying 
conditions less beneficial to an employee compared to that provided under the Act although the Act is generally 
applicable only to employees earning a basic monthly salary below SGD4,500. See also s 21 of the Work Injury 
Compensation Act (Singapore, Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed), which disallows the exclusion or limitation of an employer’s 
liability to compensate an employee for personal injury incurred in the course of employment. For international sale of 
goods contracts, the provisions of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods apply by virtue of 
Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act (Singapore, Cap 283A, 2013 Rev Ed). 
49  Such as not to discourage foreign commercial parties from agreeing to have their disputes adjudicated or arbitrated in 
Singapore: an argument raised in favour of the UK. See Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 1975 at 
para 232.  
50  Such as not subjecting Singapore exporters to restrictions that would not apply to their foreign competitors, an 
argument raised in favour of the UK. See Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 1975 at paras 213 and 
228. 
51  Except consumer purchases of land, employment and pawnbroking contracts: see Schedule 1 of the CPFTA. 
52  See Schedule 2, provision 11 which specifies this as an unfair practice. 
53  See s 6(2) read with s 6(6) of the CPFTA. 
54  See also Yeo, 2014 who highlights inadequacies in Singapore law vis-a-vis the protection of consumers in insurance 
contracts. 
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seek legal advice before entering into such contracts? Woo Bih Li J in Jurong Port [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
53 was particularly concerned about the lack of statutory regulation of indemnity clauses imposed 
by businesses in a strong bargaining position on weaker businesses and, in fact, suggested legal 
reform to tighten regulation of a severity that went beyond the Morton principles (at 61–2 [18]–
[19]). The learned judge opined, obiter, that even where the protection intended was clearly 
expressed, the indemnity clause should not be upheld unless (a) evidence exists of it having been 
specifically brought to the notice of and accepted by the other contracting party; and (b) that it 
satisfied a test of reasonableness akin to the UCTA test. In fact, his Honour suggested that 
common law should make (b) a mandatory default requirement. 
Clearly, in the absence of statutory regulation, the Morton principles, if not more, would be 
needed to fill the more troubling gaps. 
Ease of Application  
The Morton principles have been criticised for making artificial distinctions that complicate their 
application. Swanton criticised the usefulness of distinguishing principles 1 and 2 deeming the 
investigations prescribed thereunder a ‘sterile debate’ (Swanton, 1988-89: 170). This criticism fails 
to appreciate the practical basis for distinguishing principle 1 from the others. Principle 1 aids in 
ascertaining the contracting parties’ expressed intention, while principles 2 and 3 aid in 
ascertaining their presumed intention. 
Swanton was also critical of distinguishing principle 2 from 3. Essentially, she questioned the 
wisdom of postponing a consideration of the proferens’ other possible liabilities to principle 3 when 
construing the words of the clause under principle 2. This is because the existence of such other 
potential liability would be reason for holding a clause ambiguous and thus requiring resolution by 
reference to the contra proferentem rule (Swanton, 1988-89: 170). 
Swanton’s argument has intuitive appeal as is evident from the apparent merging of principles 
2 and 3 in the court’s reasoning in Jurong Port.55 Principle 2 involves a contextual interpretation of 
the clause. Since principle 3 is not to be applied literally to make the existence of heads of liability 
other than negligence fatal to the proferens, it merely calls for consideration as another factor that 
forms part of the context in which the scope of the words is to be determined. Viewed this way, 
there would be no reason to distinguish the two principles. 
On the other hand, there is inherent logic in the existing sequence – one that gives maximum 
effect to the principles’ policy function. The onus is on the proferens to state clearly what the 
intended effect of the clause is. If the proferens is shy of using express references to negligence for 
fear of putting the other party off, his use of general words has to be clear enough to convey the 
intent to a reasonable person in the shoes of the other contracting party (Hollier [1972] 2 QB 71, 
78D–F and 80E–81C (Salmon LJ)). Principle 2 focuses on the general words used as understood in 
context. It further reinforces the onus on the proferens by providing that any doubt (or ambiguity) 
that arises should be read against him.  
Principle 3 prescribes extra vigilance in line with the policy consideration. Thus, despite the 
general words being wide enough to encompass negligence liability, principle 3 requires that 
contextual factors be considered to see if the parties may have intended the clause to apply to other 
heads of liability instead. This presents two stages at which a clause that makes no express 
reference to negligence may be scrutinised by the courts.  
Courts in many instances appear to have followed the existing sequence without much 
difficulty,56 even though contextual factors taken into account under principles 2 and 3 do overlap. 
What is important is to bear in mind the precise foci of the principles. For principle 2, the focus is 
on how the wording of the clause would ordinarily be understood by a reasonable person in the 
shoes of the contracting party to whom the words are addressed. Thus, contextual factors that 
provide an insight into the likely ‘understanding, assumptions and expectations’ of such a party are 
                                                          
55  See also Celthene Pty Ltd v WKJ Hauliers Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 606, 616 (Yeldham J) in footnote 74 of Swanton, 
1988–9: 170.  
56  See the UK and Singapore examples given under heading ‘Procedure in application’ above. 
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relevant.57 Factors that courts and academics have considered relevant include: the status of the 
contracting parties, whether they are commercial parties or a business and a consumer (Hollier 
[1972] 2 QB 71, 80E–81C (Salmon LJ)); the impact of other clauses on the one being considered 
(Jurong Port [2009] 4 SLR(R) 53, 60 [10]–[12]); the impact of other parts of a clause on the part 
being considered (Smith [1978] 1 WLR 165); 58  whether negligence is the only liability of the 
proferens in the circumstances (Rutter [1922] 2 KB 87, 92 (Scruttons LJ) and Alderslade [1945] 1 
KB 189, 194 (Lord Greene));59 and perhaps even whether other types of liability had been in 
contemplation at the time of contract (Jurong Port [2009] 4 SLR(R) 53, 59–60 [9]) or whether 
parties have deliberately allocated risks and liabilities as part of the contractual agreement 
(Persimmon Homes [2015] EWHC 3573 (TCC) 9 at [39]–[44]).  
For principle 3, the focus is on the degree of improbability that one contracting party would 
intend to absolve the other liability for negligence. Factors that shed light on the expectations of 
both parties are apposite. Thus, apart from whether heads of liability other than negligence exist, 
the degree of improbability would likely be informed by other contextual factors such as the facts 
surrounding the making of the contract and the contractual purpose (HIH [2003] 1 CLC 358); the 
amount chargeable by the proferens compared to his potential liabilities (Ailsa Craig [1983] 1 WLR 
964, 970C–F (Lord Fraser)); the bargaining power of a party relative to the other (Photo Production 
[1980] AC 827, 843 (Lord Wilberforce); 851 (Lord Diplock) adopted in Persimmon Homes [2015] 
EWHC 3573 (TCC) at [25] (Stuart-Smith J)); whether liability could be insured economically (Ailsa 
Craig [1983] 1 WLR 964, 966H (Lord Wilberforce); Valkonen (1995) LSJS 87, 98 [34] (Cox J)); the 
benefit received by the indemnifying party compared to its potential exposure under the indemnity; 
the rise in statutory liabilities; and industry practice in the allocation of risk, including the risk of 
negligence liability (Courtney, 2008: 194). 
Even so, the need for such precision in focus has presented challenges, as seen in the Jurong 
Port case. It could also account for why the Morton principles were applied collectively in CST 
Cleaning rather than individually. It is hard to deny that it is counter-intuitive to not consider all 
relevant contextual factors in ascertaining the presumed intention of the contracting parties. It 
does not help that principle 3 is also vulnerable to the suspicion that it is used as an artificial tool 
that tempts, or allows, the courts to impose ‘reasonableness’ under the guise of construing the 
contract to discover the parties’ intentions. Indeed, if one were to compare the contextual factors 
pertinent to principle 3 with factors pertinent to the UCTA test of reasonableness, an overlap is 
apparent. The UCTA test of reasonableness requires consideration of, inter alia, circumstances that 
were actually, or ought to have been, known to, or in the contemplation of, the contracting parties 
at the time the contract was made;60 the relative bargaining position of the parties;61 and the 
insurability of the risk. 
Is Reform Necessary? 
There are gaps in the UCTA that require filling. In the absence of statutory regulation, the Morton 
principles are necessary for this purpose. Judicial clarity and precision in the application of each 
principle is necessary, however, to provide greater coherence in their use. 
There are challenges in application of the principles due to overlapping factors in principles 2 
and 3 but they should not be overstated. Courts routinely take account of the same contextual 
factors to assess different aspects of a contract – for example, the factual circumstances 
surrounding the making of a contract may inform the meaning to be attributed to an express term 
(Zurich Insurance [2008] 3 SLR(R) 1029, 1096–7 [132] (VK Rajah JA)). 62  Equally, the same 
circumstances may inform the importance of the term so that appropriate remedies can be obtained 
                                                          
57  See, in respect of principles 2 and 3 generally, Swanton, 1988–9: 172-75.  
58  Discussed under heading ‘Satisfying principle 2’ above. 
59  But contrast with Hollier [1972] 2 QB 71, 80E–81B (Salmon LJ). 
60  Section 11(1).  
61  Section 11(2) and Schedule 2, guideline (a). 
62  See points (c) and (d). 
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upon its breach (Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as E D & F Man International (S) Pte 
Ltd) v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663, 720 [160]–[161]). 
Nevertheless, cumulatively, the difficulty in maintaining precise focus in applying principles 2 
and 3 due to the lack of intuitiveness in the undertaking; the taint of suspicion surrounding 
principle 3 given its overlap with the UCTA test of reasonableness; and the fact that the Morton 
principles may not go far enough to provide necessary protection in some instances, may be reason 
to reconsider the regime of regulation of such clauses. 
To simplify the regime of regulation, principle 3 could perhaps be discarded in tandem with 
amendments to the UCTA to eliminate troubling gaps so that the UCTA becomes the principal tool 
to regulate clauses protecting against negligence liability. Such clauses being (justifiably) 
anathema to the contracting public, one might go further and discard both principles 2 and 3 so as 
to insist that express words referring to ‘negligence’ or ‘negligence liability’ or a synonym thereof 
should always be used if the intent of a contracting party is to be excused from such liability, in 
whole or in part, while still subjecting the clause to at least a test of reasonableness. 
Yet, attractive though this approach may be, fear of over-regulation and uncertainty of contract 
that raises the costs of doing business would be an obstacle to expanding the scope of the UCTA. 
The UK experience indicates as much. In 2001, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission embarked upon an investigation into whether, inter alia, a unified regime of 
regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts,63 and protection of small businesses against 
unfair terms, were desirable and sought public consultations in 2002. 64  In 2005, the Law 
Commissions in their joint report recommended against extending UCTA controls to all C2C or 
C2B contracts, citing a wish not to over-regulate private, informal arrangements (in C2C contracts) 
and the lack of evidence of a need (in both C2C and C2B contracts).65  
Although the Law Commissions concluded that greater protection for small businesses vis-à-vis 
other businesses was necessary, 66 they nevertheless recommended preserving the exclusion of 
most67 of the B2B contracts of the types currently excluded from the scope of the UCTA citing, 
among others, the need for contractual certainty.68 
Significantly, although the 2005 joint report received in-principle acceptance from the then UK 
government, to date only its consumer law reform recommendations had been implemented,69 by 
the enactment of the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK, c 15) (CRA). 70  In the course of 
Parliamentary debates on the Consumer Rights Bill, calls for extending the UCTA’s scope to B2B 
contracts relating to intellectual property were countered by argument that there must be 
substantial evidence of clear need to justify amendment lest ‘unintended negative consequences’ 
                                                          
63  In replacement of the UK UCTA and the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations SI 1999 No 2083. 
64  See, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2005 at paras 1.6–1.7. 
65  See, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2005 at paras 6.24–6.27. 
66  See, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2005 at Part 5. 
67  Unfair Terms in Contracts (2005) Law Com No 292; Scot Law Com No 199 at paras 5.75–5.77. A change recommended 
was for the imposition of UCTA controls on B2B international contracts of supply where a local business (big or small) 
contracts for the supply of goods from a foreign party: see paras 7.57–7.58 and 7.59–7.61. 
68  It was also highlighted that insurance contracts in the UK were already regulated by the UK Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 and the contracts excluded being specialised contracts, legal advice would usually have been sought: 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2005 at para 5.76. Note, however, the UK Society of Authors’ 
contrasting recommendation in their February 2014 response to the public consultation on the UK Consumer Rights 
Bill that the UCTA should be amended to bring contracts relating to the creation or transfer of a right or interest in 
intellectual property within the UCTA’s scope of regulation: see www.societyofauthors.org. 
69  The UK Government is not planning to implement the 2005 Report recommendations pertaining to protection of small 
businesses in B2B contracts, only the recommendations pertaining to B2C contracts were to be reviewed and updated 
with a view to enacting a Consumer Rights Act: see, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2012, at 
paras 1.1–1.5 and 1.26. See also, Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, 2013, containing updated 
recommendations for reform of B2C contracts regulation. 
70  The CRA received the Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 and came into force on 1 October 2015. 
Australian Journal of Asian Law  Vol 17 No 1 
17 
ensue.71 These sentiments are likely to be echoed by the Singapore government which is known for 
its business-friendly stance.72 
Yet, it should be noted that B2C contracts have always received greater protection in the UK 
by virtue of the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 73  (UTCCR) –all un-
negotiated terms (not just exemption of liability clauses), with limited exceptions,74 in all B2C 
contracts are susceptible to a review for fairness.75 The CRA consolidated consumer protection laws 
in one piece of legislation. In particular, it replaced the UK UCTA and the UTCCR in regulating 
unfair terms in B2C contracts, whether the terms were negotiated or not.76 Notably, while clauses 
excluding negligence liability resulting in death or personal injury in contracts of insurance or 
relating to interests in land are not automatically banned under the CRA, they nevertheless 
remain subject to a review for fairness.77 The CRA thus provides a level of protection currently 
unmatched by either the Singapore UCTA or CPFTA.78  
In light of the above, it may be premature to discard the Morton principles, especially if there is 
a reluctance to increase the scope of application of the UCTA (or the CPFTA), or provide adequate 
statutory regulation in any other form for both small businesses and consumers. 
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